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ARTICLES
ACCESS CONTROLS IN THE DIGITAL ERA AND
THE FAIR USE/FIRST SALE DOCTRINES
Eric Matthew Hinkest
Abstract
Each sale of an iTunes track means that a copy of music has
been distributed that cannot be legally resold, edited, excerpted, or
otherwise sampled by that user. This scenario has been repeated over
2.5 billion times since the inception of the iTunes Music Store. Much
like software sales, consumers are now purchasing licenses to
"access" the work instead of the content, given that access to these
works is controlled by Digital Rights Management (DRM) schemes
bolstered by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). In
enacting §1201(a) of the DMCA, Congress effectively created an
additional exclusive right for content providers: controlling access to
a work.
t Associate, Intellectual Property Media Technology Group, McDermott Will & Emery LLP,
Washington, D.C.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"iTunes really competes with piracy, not with the other services.
Piracy is the big enemy. Buying music online legally is good
karma." - Steve Jobs, CEO of Apple Computer'
Pirating a copyrighted work is not what it used to be: it is easier.
Before xerography and bits-and-bytes, there was handwriting. If you
wanted another copy of a book, you handwrote yourself one.
Furthermore, distributing that handwritten copy required a physical
act of bringing it from one place to another. All in all, this was an
extremely laborious process. Unprotected digital works are not
subject to such encumbrances. Digitized (unprotected) copyrighted
material can now be spread far and wide over the Internet. Copyright
owners are understandably concerned by the fact that each copy of a
digital work is as good as the last one, and is not subject to the same
material degradation as a cassette or record. Finally, digital works are
compact and easily archived compared to their traditional physical
counterparts. The days of the rogue printing press are gone. We are
now in the digital age of piracy.
The best starting point for exploring the effects of digital content
on copyright law and copyright owners is examining the most
successful implementation of digitally protected downloadable
content to date: Apple's iTunes Music Store ("iTunes"). iTunes offers
a library of over 4 million songs from the 4 major labels as well as
hundreds of independent labels. 2 Able to run equally well on both
Macs and PC's, the service has boasted over an 84% market share, is
available in 22 countries, and has sold more than two and one half
billion songs.3 Individual tracks can be purchased for 99 cents, while
complete albums begin at $9.99.4 The growth rate of iTunes sales has
been nothing short of astonishing. As of October 12, 2005, iTunes had
surpassed 500 million music downloads since its initial launch in
April 2003, and was averaging 1.8 million song downloads per day
1. See 1FPI, 2005 DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 5 (2005), available at
http://www.ifpi.org/site-content/library/digital-music-report-2005.pdf.
2. See Apple.com, iPod + iTunes, http://www.apple.com/itunes/ (last visited Apr. 20,
2007). A more recent press release from Apple reports 100 Million iPods Sold, stating that
Apple currently offers a music library in excess of 5 million songs,
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/04/09ipod.html.
3. See Press Release, Apple, 100 Million iPods Sold, Apr. 9, 2007,
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/04/09ipod.html.
4. See Apple.com, iPod + iTunes, iTunes Store,
http://www.apple.com/itunes/store/music.html (last visited May 13, 2007).
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for its 10 million registered users.5 On February 23, 2006, Apple
reported that iTunes downloads had reached a total of 1 billion
6
songs. Less than a year later, on January 9, 2007, Apple reported
that iTunes downloads had reached 2 billion.
7
Apple's downloadable music is encoded in the open standard
Advanced Audio Coding (AAC) format at 128 kbps, and it
incorporates a proprietary Digital Rights Management System (DRM)
called FairPlay.8 Apple restricts users to downloading one unique
copy of a purchased song, but allows them to transfer the song to an
unlimited number of iPods.9 The DRM also prevents more than seven
identical burns of a purchased music playlist.' 0 Because Apple does
not officially license FairPlay, it is a proprietary standard only
supported through Apple on the iPod or the iTunes program.1 1
Through iTunes, Apple is able to regulate what consumers do with
their purchased music by using a technologically implemented
combination of copyright law and contractual provisions. The
thoroughness of Apple's control, however, derives from the unique
contract/copyright interaction in concert with DRM. Copyright Law
contains exceptions that allow consumers who purchase copies of
works a potentially greater amount of freedom than these contractual
license agreements. As a prime example of this new era, Apple is
navigating uncharted waters, and iTunes will serve as a basis for
discussion regarding the effect of access controls on fair use and its
5. See Charles Goldsmith, Apple IPod Success Isn't Sweet Music for Record Company
Sales, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 2, 2005,
http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/newspid--nifea&&sid=aHP5KoI pozM0.
6. See Apple.com, iTunes Music Store Downloads Top One Billion Songs, Feb. 23,
2006, http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2006/feb/23itms.html.
7. See Apple.com, iTunes Music Store Downloads Tops Two Billion Songs, Jan. 9, 2007,
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/01/09itunes.html.
8. Apple.com, iTunes Store Customer Service,
http://www.apple.com/support/itunes/store/songs/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2007) ("Songs purchased
and downloaded from ... [iTunes] are AAC Protected files and have a bitrate of 128 kilobits per
second (kbit/s)."). Recently, Apple issued a press release which stated that 256kbps AAC
Format DRM-Free Songs from the EMI Music Label Catalog would be offered in May for $1.29
alongside the original 128kbps AAC encoded versions with DRM for 99 cents. Apple.com,
Apple Unveils Higher Quality DRM-Free Music on the iTunes Store, Apr. 2, 2007,
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/04/02itunes.html.
9. See Apple.com, iTunes Music Store: Terms of Service, § 9(b),
http://www.apple.com/legal/itunes/us/service.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2007).
10. Id.
11. See Apple.com, Steve Jobs: Thoughts on Music,
http://www.apple.com/hotnews/thoughtsonmusic/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2007) (stating "[a]pple
has concluded that if it licenses FairPlay to others, it can no longer guarantee to protect the
music it licenses from the big four music companies.").
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close relative the first sale doctrine, as well as the preservation of
content in the digital era.
II. THE FAIR USE AND THE FAIR SALE DOCTRINES IN
COPYRIGHT LAW
In an official report, the United States Copyright Office
mentioned that future technologies and events could have "serious
consequences for the operation of the first sale doctrine" that might
require legislative attention at some later date.' 2 Ultimately, a "wait
and see" approach was suggested to see how the market matured. 13
Under Copyright law, copyright owners enjoy six exclusive
rights: reproduction, preparation of derivative works, distribution,
public performance, public display, and digital transmission
performance. 14 In order to engage in any of these exclusive rights, a
person must request and receive permission from the copyright
owner. The first sale doctrine, as codified in Section 109 of the
Copyright Act, limits a copyright owner's distribution right in that he
can only exploit the copyrighted work up to the point of the first
sale.15 The goal of the first sale doctrine was to balance copyright
owners' exclusive rights with the public's right to enjoy and exchange
copyrighted material for the public benefit.' 6 It encourages and allows
the dissemination of copyrighted works, much like the "fair use"
doctrine is designed to encourage and allow parody and criticism. 17
The concepts of fair use and the first sale doctrine are interrelated:
without access to the work, one cannot effectively utilize it for either
purpose.
The first sale doctrine allows the owner of a lawfully obtained
copyrighted work to "sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of
that copy" without the permission of the copyright owner.'8 This
entitles wholesalers to sell copies to retailers, libraries to lend copies
to patrons, and persons who have lawfully acquired copies of works
12. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) Section 104 Report: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 12 (2001) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights),
available at http://www.judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/printers/107th/76669.pdf.
13. Id.
14. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
15. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2000).
16. See Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C & C Beauty Sales, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1378, 1388
(C.D. Cal. 1993).
17. See 17U.S.C.§ 107(2000).
18. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2000).
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to give them to friends or family. Many parties are able to benefit, as
the copyright owner's exclusive distribution right no longer applies to
a particular copy once it has been sold for the first time. By creating
secondary market channels, the first sale doctrine has enabled
transactions to occur outside the normal chains of commerce. It is
through these transactions that these works remain accessible to the
public even if the copyright holder ceases production or distribution
of the work.
The first sale doctrine developed out of a judicially created
principle based on the goal of reducing encumbrances on restraints of
alienation of tangible property. 19 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld this
principle in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus.20 In Bobbs-Merrill the
Supreme Court held that a copyright owner could not restrict the work
in the resale market by imposing mandatory price schemes. 21  The
plaintiff copyright owner placed a notice inside the book: "The price
of this book at retail is one dollar net. No dealer is licensed to sell it at
a less price, and a sale at a less price will be treated as infringement of
the copyright., 22 The defendant sold the book at a price of 89 cents.
23
Shortly after this case, Congress codified the first sale doctrine in
Section 27 of the 1909 Copyright Act.
24
This doctrine is currently codified in 17 U.S.C. §109 of the
Copyright Act, which explains that lawful ownership of an item is not
the same as owning the copyright. 25 The owner of the item can lend,
resell, give away, and/or destroy the copyrighted item, but is not
granted the right to copy the item in its entirety. 26 The transfer of the
copy does not include the transfer of the item's copyright, whether
digital or tangible in nature.27 However, the first sale doctrine has
never allowed someone who owns a particular copy to make further
copies of it without the permission of the copyright owner because a
copyright owner's most fundamental right - to make reproductions of
his work - applies even after its first sale.
19. See R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44
B.C. L. REv. 577, 580 (2003).
20. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
21. See id. at 350-51.
22. Id. at 341.
23. Id.
24. See United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 377 F.2d 872, 882 (2d. Cir.
1967).
25. See 17 U.S.C § 109(a) (2000).
26. H. Ward Classen, Fundamentals of Software Licensing, 37 IDEA 1, 3 (1996).
27. Id.
20071
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This "right" is very relevant in regards to iTunes downloads. In
downloading the music, you have agreed to certain terms of use under
the iTunes Store Terms of Sale.28 This is not the same as purchasing a
CD, which is traditionally protected under copyright law. There is no
way to resell music that you buy from iTunes legally, due to a
combination of contract law and DRM technology bolstered by the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act. (DMCA). The iTunes Terms of
Service (ToS) specifically state that purchased, DRM'ed, music is for
"personal, non-commercial use," and that users are only "entitled to
export, burn.., or copy Products solely for personal, noncommercial
use." 29 The consumer purchases not a copy of the work, but only a
license to "access" the work. In enacting §1201(a) of the DMCA,3 0
Congress effectively created an additional exclusive right for content
providers: controlling access to a work.
III. LET'S MAKE A DEAL
In partnering with Apple, the music industry has clearly decided
that the best way to navigate the digital minefield is to incorporate
technologically implemented contract law in selling downloadable
music, rather than to simply rely on copyright law, as is done in
traditional channel sales of content on physical media. Contract law
allows copyright holders a greater degree of control over digital
content. In the cases of iTunes, users agree to a click-wrap contract,
indicating the number of computers on which the music can reside,
the number of times it can be burned, the number of portable music
devices on which it can be loaded, along with other terms and
conditions that control the user experience to an exacting degree.
Apple requires that a user agree to all of the terms in its iTunes
software license agreement.
31
Contract law can effectively displace what copyright law
considers a permissible range of activities with authored material.
28. See iTunes Store Terms of Sale, http://www.apple.com/legal/itunes/us/sales.html (last
visited May 13, 2007).
29. See Apple's iTunes Music Store: Terms of Service, supra note 9, at § 9(b).
30. Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860,
Title 1 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201-1204). The DMCA was passed by the United States
House and Senate as H.R. 2281 on October 12, 1998. President Clinton signed the Bill into
Public Law No. 105-304 on October 28, 1998.
31. See Apple.com, iTunes Music Store: Terms of Service, supra note 9, at § 9(b). More
recently, iTunes has also begun to sell movies. The notable limitation of the DRM in this case is
that while the movie can be played on an unlimited number of authorized iPods, burning of
purchased content to disc for playback, a feature available for purchased music, is prohibited.
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Apple's iTunes' terms of use permit purchased music to be copied
onto up to five computers.32 The contractual arrangement between
Apple and the consumer creates a permissible use enclave that would
otherwise be occupied by an exclusive fight under copyright law.
Normally, a copyright owner would be able to sue an individual for
engaging in such copying activity, but Apple is able to grant such
exclusive and non-exclusive rights to its end users through its
negotiated arrangement with the record labels. The combination of
contractual usage agreements and DRM bolstered by the DMCA
effectively allows Apple to specify permitted and prohibited uses of
the content. Apple goes to great lengths to state that a user must agree
"not to attempt to, or to assist another person to, circumvent, reverse
engineer, decompile, disassemble, or otherwise tamper with any of
the security components related to such Usage Rules for any reason
whatsoever." 33 Apple also states that its users "agree not to modify,
rent, lease, loan, sell, distribute, or create derivative works" from
downloaded songs,34 making it clear contractually that the licensee
has no digital first sale right.35 Unlike a secondary market in which
copyright owners are no longer able to effectively control the
dissemination of their works, Apple explains that it retains the "right
to change, suspend, remove, or disable access ... at any time without
notice." 36 It can readily do so if necessary at the speed of a mouse-
click. Because Apple is able to limit what users do with their
purchased songs through a technologically implemented contract, the
range of end user activities resides in a defined bubble. Furthermore,
Apple is effectively pioneering a protected content distribution system
model that could eventually function without competitive interference
from secondary source retail channels.
While much more durable than traditional audiocassettes, CD's
have a definite physical lifespan and are subject to physical wear-and-
tear from use. 3 7 Digital files don't similarly degrade but are subject to
32. Id. at § 9(b).
33. Id. at § 8(b).
34. Id. at § 13(b).
35. William W. Fisher, III, iTunes: How Copyright, Contract, and Technology Shape the
Business of Digital Media - A Case Study, 55-58, Jun. 15, 2004,
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/media/uploads/81/iTunesWhitePaperO604.pdf.
36. See Apple's iTunes Music Store: Terms of Service, supra note 9, at § 13(b).
37. See Mathematics, Numbers and Computers: What is the Lifespan of a CD-Rom
Disc?,
http://science.enotes.com/science-fact-finder/mathematics-numbers-computers/what-lifespan-
cd-rom-disc (last visited May 13, 2007).
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accidental deletion, corruption, and obsolescence. The file's playback
quality is maintained from the first copy to the last. When combined
with the ease of copying a digital file, content providers' concerns
about maintaining new sales in the digital era are apparent and
legitimate. However, when users buy an iTunes song, they can only
use an iPod or the iTunes program to access the protected content,
unless the music is burned to CD by the user, and even then, the
number of unique "playlist bums" may be limited to seven. 8 These
restrictions prevent users from engaging in the resale or rampant
illegal distribution of downloaded iTunes songs,39 perhaps to the
detriment of the existing service. The iTunes click-wrap license
renders the first sale doctrine, applicable to tangible media,
inapplicable here by reducing the user of the downloaded copyrighted
40music work from an owner to a mere possessor.
While Apple is in a position to benefit both from contract and
copyright law, contract law is primarily limited to restitution through
monetary damages. Copyright law provides a much stronger set of
remedies: injunctive relief, criminal penalties, and the option of
statutory damages or defendant's profits plus actual damages.41 In the
case of contracts, monetary damages are more likely to be minimal,
unless a breaching user engages in large-scale copying or distribution.
Users might even breach contracts to make fair use of protected
works for satirical or parody purposes since they could face only
nominal damages. 42 Contracts are nevertheless uniquely advantageous
if enforceable, as they are able to create protected enclaves of
permissible activities within a copyright framework. This enables
parties to assign or waive protections and defenses normally
associated under traditional copyright doctrine. Apple's utilization of
contract law, when combined with the protection that DRM receives
under the DMCA, leaves the content providers confident that Apple
can exercise a high level of control over the distribution and use of
copyrighted content on their behalf. DRM effectively adds an element
38. See Christopher Breen, iTunes and the 7-burn Limit, Playlist, Dec. 20, 2005,
http://playlistmag.com/weblogs/ipodblog/2005/12/7bun/index.php.
39. See supra note 8 and adjoining text.
40. Victor F. Calaba, Quibbles 'N Bits: Making a Digital First Sale Doctrine Feasible, 9
MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2002), available at
http://www.mttlr.org/volnine/calaba.pdf.
41. See 17 U.S.C §§ 501-505, 509.
42. See Christian H. Nadan, Software Licensing in the 21st Century: Are Software
"Licenses" Really Sales, And How Will The Software Industry Respond?, 32 AIPLA Q.J. 555,
636 n.274 (2004).
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of predictability to usage that is not possible with physical media and
reins in the potential massive piracy that can occur with unprotected
digital content.
IV. DRM WITHIN THE DMCA
DRM is different from security measures used to protect
electronic transactions. While hacking into one electronic transaction
doesn't necessarily compromise the others, hacking a DRM scheme
threatens the protections on every article utilizing that scheme that has
been sold up to that point.43 Anti-circumvention provisions are
necessary because DRM can't protect itself, and it is also expensive to
continuously reengineer. Jon Johansen has been one of the most
prolific DRM hackers.44 Mr. Johansen is living proof of the challenge
that DRM faces. Perhaps the DMCA is the right law at the right time
and reflects Congress' acknowledgment that while it is not possible to
build a perfect mousetrap, it is possible to legally prevent individuals
from tricking the mousetrap. The DMCA acts in this way to bolster
the effectiveness and integrity of DRM schemes in the face of these
hackers' proficiency and ease by which their "burglar tools" can be
distributed to others.
DRM functions like a speed governor, cutting the fuel off to an
engine at a certain highway speed. To deter the removal of the
"governor" by unauthorized "mechanics," the DMCA contains strict
anti-circumvention provisions bolstered by significant penalties. 45 The
DMCA, as codified, prohibits circumventing DRM designed to
prevent someone from gaining access to a work, trafficking in devices
that can circumvent such access controls, and trafficking in
43. lain Thomson, Norwegian court clears 'DVD Jon', Jan. 8, 2003,
http://www.vnunet.com/articles/print/2121179 (stating that the DeCss hacking program was
capable of breaking the encryption used by DVDs in general, not one specific copy). See also
Robert C. Piasentin, Unlawful? Innovative? Unstoppable?: A Comparative Analysis of the
Potential Legal Liability Facing P2P End-Users in the United States, United Kingdom and
Canada, 14 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 195, 225 (2006) (stating "once the original DRM [system]
is hacked, any works which were protected under that system will become vulnerable to being
copied or shared by anyone with access to the hacking technology.").
44. See So Sue Me: Jon Lech Johansen's Blog, About Me, http://nanocrew.net/about (last
visited May 13, 2007). Jon has hacked Apple's Fairplay DRM for iTunes twice, reverse
engineered the unique user keys Apple attached to the downloaded music to enable stripping of
the DRM, hacked Apple's wireless encryption for its AirTunes service, and has even reverse
engineered cryptography contained in the iTunes program itself when Apple attempted to
forcibly upgrade its users to a newer and supposedly more secure version of the program. Id.
45. Jeffrey D. Sullivan & Thomas M. Morrow, Practicing Reverse Engineering in an Era
of Growing Constraints Under the Digital Millenium Copyright Act and Other Provisions, 14
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 24-26 (2003).
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circumvention devices in order to protect the copyright holder's
exclusive copying and distribution rights.4 6 A device is covered under
the DMCA if it is primarily designed for, has limited commercially
significant purposes aside from, or is marketed for, circumvention.4 v
Furthermore, the traditional fair use defense to infringement does not
apply to DMCA offenses.48
Access control provisions under the DMCA mean that the statute
can be used to enforce controlled access and uses of copyrighted
works. As an example, Apple's iPod is the only device capable of
playing FairPlay DRM'ed purchased music from the iTunes service.
This is accomplished through a very refined hardware-software
interaction and programmed digital safeguards. Apple also controls
the ability to authorize additional computers for iTunes purchased
music through a back-end infrastructure, accessed through the iTunes
program interface. This enables Apple to monitor how the works are
being used, but it also allows Apple to meticulously and predictably
control present and future access for non-compliance with its terms of
use. 4 9 Apple's DRM prevents direct dissemination of the purchased
music from user to user, as well as over the Internet. Simply loaning
iTunes purchased music to a friend for playback would require the
user to give his Apple ID and Password to authorize the computer to
play. The friend would then have access to the user's credit card
information and be able to purchase additional music, which functions
as an effective deterrent. Content providers are willing to distribute
their media through iTunes because users' actions are predictably
limited to a defined realm of possibilities, because of DRM, and as
I've shown here, for other reasons as well.
Apple is also able to contractually exclude exemptions contained
in the DMCA because the iTunes Terms of Service displace them.
One such example is the narrow exemption in the DMCA that exists
for reverse engineering: The scientific method of taking something
apart in order to figure out how it works.50 "As long as it is a fair use
and performed exclusively to enable two computer programs to
communicate with each other ('interoperability'), circumvention is
46. See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: U.S. Copyright Office Summary
at 4, Dec. 1998, http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Apple's iTunes Music Store: Terms of Service, supra note 9, at §§ 14(a)-(b).
50. See Wikipedia Online Dictionary, "Reverse engineering,"
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ReverseEngineering (last visited Apr. 8, 2007).
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allowed., 51 Also, both trafficking bans under the DMCA can be
avoided if devices are distributed only for the purpose of achieving
interoperability.52 While such activities may be narrowly permitted
under the DMCA, the iTunes Terms of Use explicitly prohibit all
reverse engineering activities.53 In the iTunes context, Apple is
specifically concerned about the reverse engineering of its DRM
scheme and hardware/software interaction.54 It will be interesting to
see the effect of Apple's announcement that they will be offering
DRM-free music from EMI on iTunes' Terms of Service and if other
content providers follow EMI's move.
55
In conjunction with contract law, the DMCA bolsters Apple's
FairPlay DRM system in 3 distinct ways. First, the DMCA
enumerates specific penalties for trafficking in tools that would
circumvent FairPlay. Prior to the DMCA, traffickers of such devices
were not liable as long as their devices were "capable of substantial
non-infringing uses."56 The DMCA, however, has created causes of
action regardless of whether these tools have infringing or non-
infringing uses.57
Secondly, the DMCA would treat FairPlay as an access control
and a copy control. The iPod is the only device designed to decrypt
the FairPlay DRM, which falls within the realm of an access control.
This allows Apple to regulate reverse engineering activities despite
the narrow exemptions permitted under the DMCA. FairPlay also
limits the number of unique playlist copies to seven CD bums, such
that it functions as a copy control. 58 This dual treatment under the
DMCA bolsters the overall integrity of the system.
Lastly, the DMCA enables Apple to be a party to suits that are
normally reserved for copyright owners because it allows "[a]ny
person injured by a violation of section 1201 or 1202 [to] bring a civil
action in an appropriate United States district court for such
violation., 59 Traditional infringement actions are limited to copyright
holders, 60 but both Apple and copyright holders can bring DMCA
51. Fisher, supra note 35, at 37 (internal citation omitted).
52. Id.
53. See Apple's iTunes Music Store: Terms of Service, supra note 9, at § 8(b).
54. See Apple.com, Steve Jobs: Thoughts on Music, supra note 11.
55. See supra note 8 and adjoining text.
56. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
57. See supra notes 46-48 and adjoining text.
58. See Apple's iTunes Music Store: Terms of Service, supra note 9, at § 9(b).
59. 17 U.S.C. § 1203(a) (2000).
60. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2000).
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suits. The DMCA functions to protect the implementation of the
Fairplay system, providing a strong deterrent against compromising
the DRM, aside from the contractually enforced provisions of the
system. By arguably preventing reverse engineering of the DRM, the
DMCA maintains the iPod as the sole compatible device.61
V. DOES THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE APPLY TO DIGITAL
COPIES?
The "Double Dutch Bus" incident tested the waters as to the
industry's reaction to the resale of digital music. George Hotelling
placed a purchased iTunes song on eBay ("Double Dutch Bus").62
eBay moved to block it, maintaining that it violated its
"Downloadable Media Policy", which prohibits the listing of items or
products to be delivered electronically through the Internet.
63
Arguments have been made that this conduct should have been
protected under the first sale doctrine, which makes no real distinction
between digital and non-digital works.64
Opponents of the doctrine's applicability to digital works
maintain that transmitting a digitized work requires making a copy of
the original, which is in direct violation of a right reserved to
copyright owners, the right of reproduction - a right to which the first
sale exception isn't applicable.65 Also, the doctrine has been argued to
not apply to digital works, given that the user isn't transmitting his
"particular" copy.66 Because the original copy remains on the user's
computer while the duplicate copy is sent to the recipient, a secondary
copy is in fact being made that is entirely separate from the primary
copy. Lastly, they maintain that the rapid digitization of content could
upset the balance that the doctrine provides between vibrant trade and
copyright owners' rights to exploit their works.6 7
61. See Tony Smith, Apple iPod Out of Tune With Real's Harmony, THE REGISTER:
ScI/TECH NEWS FOR THE WORLD, Dec. 15, 2004,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/15/apple-vs-real/. Real tried to implement a mechanism
("Harmony") by which music purchased from its music store would play on the iPod. Apple's
response was to tweak its player software to prevent this music from being compatible. Id.
62. Posting of George Hotelling to 90% Crud,
http://george.hotelling.net/90percent/geekery/impractical.php. (Sept. 9, 2003, 23:43).
63. See eBay.com, Downloadable Media Policy,
http://pages.ebay.com.au/help/community/png-downloadable.html (last visited May 13, 2007).
64. See 17 U.S.C § 109 (2000).
65. Calaba, supra note 40, at 11-15.
66. Id. at 14.
67. Id. at 15.
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Proponents of the first sale doctrine's applicability to digital
works argue that the Copyright Act should not be interpreted so
narrowly so as to be inapplicable to the situation in which a non-
particular digital copy is transferred by means of a digital network.68
Additionally, the doctrine has been argued to focus on the scope of
the property interest being transferred, rather than "the nature of the
land or chattel that is the object of the property interest., 69 Some
proponents have argued then that a digital copy should not therefore
be denied coverage under the first sale doctrine, even if contracted
away as in Apple's case. In response, opponents would rebut this
argument on the grounds that there is no effective way to ensure that
the sender would delete his copy once sold.
VI. THE CONCEPT OF FAIR USE
The Copyright Act grants authors control of the reproduction,
public performance, display, and distribution, along with a monopoly
on the creation of derivative works.70 The concept of fair use
functions as a safety valve on this monopoly. Copyright law seeks to
promote the production and distribution of creative works by
conferring property rights on authors. 7' The concept of fair use serves
to mediate between these property rights and the constitutional rights
72
of public access and free speech embodied in the First Amendment,
based on the belief that the public is entitled to freely use portions of
copyrighted materials for purposes of commentary and criticism. Fair
use also serves an important social function by allowing for the use of
parts of creative works73 provided that the incorporation is made for a
limited and "transformative" purpose such as to comment upon them,
through criticism or parody.7 4 The concept has evolved with
68. Id.
69. Id. at 19 (citing Reply Comments of the Library Associations Before the Library of
Congress, The United States Copyright Office and The Department of Commerce, National
Telecommunications and Information Administration, Washington, D.C., Sept. 5, 2000,
http://www.arl.org/info/frni/copy/letter0605O0.html).
70. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
71. Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law's Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REv. 63, 103-04 (2002-2003).
72. See ChillingEffects.org, Frequently Asked Questions (and Answers) about Chilling
Effects Clearinghouse, http://www.chillingeffects.org/anticirumvention/faq.cgi (last visited May
13, 2007) (discussing the free speech rights in light of copyrights).
73. Id.
74. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 10 U.S. 569, 579 ("Suffice it to say now that
parody has an obvious claim to transformative value,. . . It can provide social benefit, by
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technology on a case-specific basis, mediating the capabilities of new
technologies and constraints of copyright law. In the case of criticism,
fair use principles allow a subsequent author to reproduce and
incorporate the copyrighted work in the process of commenting or
critiquing it.75 The fair use doctrine in this case relies on the fact that
the public benefits from subsequent review and discussion of
copyrighted works. A parody on the other hand is a work that satirizes
the copyrighted work for comic effect. 76 Courts have acknowledged
that making a parody necessitates taking copyrighted elements from
the original work so as to conjure up the original in the mind of the
viewer/reader. 77 In conducting a fair use analysis, Courts use a four-
factor test: (1) the purpose and character of the subsequent use; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of
the portion taken; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market.7 8 More important than the courtroom test, however, is the real
world applicability of fair use.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Sony that home taping ("time-
shifting") of a free television program constituted fair use79 was a
landmark case. The Sony Court's decision is that much more
important because when recording a television program, the program
is recorded in its entirety for entirely consumptive reasons, without a
transformative return of the work to the marketplace. The judicial
analysis undertaken by the Court resulted in an evolution of the fair
use doctrine to accommodate VCR technology. While the state of
DRM technology was more primitive at that time, there were already
efforts by the motion picture studios to control video content. 80 In
Sony, the motion picture studios argued to the Court that Sony should
build a sensor into every VCR that would detect "no copy" signals
shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new one. We thus line up with
the courts that have held that parody, like other comment or criticism, may claim fair use ....").
75. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) ("[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.").
76. Brent Giles Davis, Identity Theft: Tribute Bands, Grand Rights, and Dramatico-
Musical Performances, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 845, 879 (2006).
77. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
78. See 17 U.S.C § 107 (2000).
79. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 417 (1984).
80. Technology Administration, Comments Solicited for the Public Workshop on Digital
Entertainment & Rights Management, Jul. 2002,
http://www.technology.gov/Events/DRM0207/DRM_0207-2.htm.
ACCESS CONTROLS, FAIR USE & FIRST SALE 699
that would be embedded into television broadcasts, thereby enabling
copyright owners to mark their movies as "not for copying. 81
Fair use is an imprecise concept that has evolved over time, even
though it is outlined through the four-factor test. The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) is a significant amendment to
copyright law, and has created a new category of copyright violations
that make it illegal to circumvent access controls on digital content
and devices.82 By utilizing digital locks to protect copyrighted
materials, content providers are able to carefully control who can
access, use, and/or copy their digital works and under what
circumstances, measures arguably necessary to prevent potentially
massive digital piracy. Consumer rights organizations have argued
that the DMCA moves away from Sony's fair use principles, an
argument that content holders dispute. Given the wild success of the
iTunes model, the issue doesn't seem to concern the user base in
general.
Historically, judicial review of fair use has served to mediate the
resulting tension between the constraints of copyright and the
capabilities of new technologies. As new technologies developed,
courts generally have had the first opportunity to apply copyright law
to them with Congress lagging behind. This keeps the public,
technologists, and copyright owners from having to approach
Congress for a legislative solution for each new technology that is
developed. Fair use under normal circumstances is accomplished
without permission of the copyright owner, but if an issue arises with
regards to the "fairness" of the use, court intervention to resolve the
dispute is available. Some interest groups have argued that if the new
opportunities for fair use are prevented at the outset by a provider's
DRM, the circumvention of which is unlawful under the DMCA, the
concept of fair use as it relates to satirical, parody, or commentary
works, is a moot point. In response, the content providers could point
to all the advantages that digital media provides, one being consumer
choice for the delivery of media is at an all time high. Consumers can
get their content through brick and mortar purchases, Internet
purchases (of tangible media), mail subscriptions, Internet
subscriptions, and finally Internet downloads. When one looks at
market models that actually work, like iTunes, the usage rights are
81. See Molly Torsen, Lexmark, Watermarks, Skylink and Markeplaces: Misuse and
Misperception of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's Anticircumvention Provision, 4 CHI.-
KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 117, 126 (2004).
82. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
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actually quite generous and transparent to the normal user.
Furthermore, the content providers argue that the range of activities,
which these interest groups have called fair use, extend beyond its
judicially defined scope.83
The DMCA provides an exemption for non-profit libraries,
archives, and educational institutions to circumvent a system
protecting a copyrighted work in order to make a determination of
whether or not to acquire the work.84 However, this exemption applies
only to those circumstances where accessing the work is not possible
in another medium.85 The exemption also permits circumvention only
for the limited time it takes the institution to make the decision
whether or not to acquire the work.86 Libraries and other educational
institutions claim that these rights management schemes give too
much control to the copyright owner and can affect the public's
access to these works. Content providers respond that because digital
works are easier to duplicate and distribute, these cost savings are
passed onto the public.
VII. MARKET CHANNEL EFFECTS OF THE FIRST SALE
DOCTRINE ON FAIR USE AND THE ROLE OF THE
DMCA
Indeed, creativity wants to be paid. Copyright law provides
incentives to authors to create works, and, as a result, maximizes
public access to those works. The first sale doctrine has been an
integral part of US copyright law for over a century, allowing those
who buy copies of a copyrighted work to resell, rent, or lend those
copies to others.87 It has also been primarily responsible for the legal
development of used book and music stores, video rental stores, and
even public libraries, which can lend CD's to patrons.88 The
application of the doctrine has increased the overall affordability of
copies of works, primarily by creating secondary sale, rental, and
lending markets that can offer consumers the product at a lower price
than that charged by the copyright owner for the purchase of a new
copy.89 It has also increased the overall availability of works by
83. As discussed in this paper, fair use is a doctrine that has been defined over time by a
litany of cases.
84. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d) (2000).
85. See id. at § 1201(d)(2).
86. See id. at § 1201(d)(l)(A).
87. Reese, supra note 19, at 577.
88. Id. at 586, 588-90.
89. Id. at 586.
ACCESS CONTROLS, FAIR USE & FIRST SALE 701
making it still possible to obtain access to a work when it goes out of
print or when a copyright owner decides to withdraw it from the
source. 90 Furthermore, from a preservation aspect, a secondary market
could increase the likelihood that a copy or copies of the work will be
preserved over time. 91
It has been argued that the increased digital dissemination of
works in the form of DRM protected copies, including FairPlay
content from iTunes, would result in the existence of fewer freely
transferable copies of copyrighted works that can be distributed
through the secondary markets, but to place the blame squarely on the
DMCA is to misplace it. It's clear that consumers want the content
that the providers are selling: 2.5 Billion times over in the case of
iTunes. DRM makes it possible that there's a sale in the first place. In
the case of iTunes, consumers are clearly benefiting from
digitalization through savings in inventory, material, and distribution
costs. Critics that say that library activities may be stifled as a result
of the use of DRM protected works instead of traditional physical
copies are similarly missing the point. Using the music industry as a
model, consumers now have more choice than ever. There are
numerous choices for acquiring music online. The same could
eventually be true for libraries in the acquisition of their works.
Traditionally, the first sale doctrine forces copyright owners to
account for the secondary market in pricing the initial copy of a work,
as the secondary market can compete with the primary market. In the
absence of a secondary market, copyright owners are able to build in
a higher price for the first copy. 92 This conundrum means that if
copyright owners charge more for a new copy of a work, then a used
copy of a work may become more attractive. Furthermore, as the
secondary market for a newly released work grows, competition from
other sources will force the price downward, as is evidenced by the
price of hardback book sales versus paperbacks. If every sale is a new
sale that cannot be resold, then no such market pressure exists. Even
so, the growth of DRM has resulted in many different vendors
jumping into the content marketplace. Perhaps resale is no longer
90. Id. at 594.
91. There is a counterargument that for some works, a monopoly increases access
because of the content provider's legal right to reproduce the work.
92. In response, the RIAA would argue that these higher prices are because the industry
loses 4.2 Billion Dollars per year due to piracy. The RIAA position is that "[c]onsumers... lose
because the shortcut savings enjoyed by pirates drive up the costs of legitimate product for
everyone. RIAA.com, Anti-Piracy: Old As the Barbary Coast, New As the Internet,
http://www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/default.asp (last visited May 13, 2007).
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important to the majority of consumers. The value of resale has
arguably and legitimately been replaced by the convenience of
purchasing the media on demand (iTunes) or even through
subscribing to a service that provides unlimited access (Napster).
In 2001, The Copyright Office addressed this issue when it
released its DMCA Section 104 Report. The Office stated that the use
of technological protection measures (such as DRM) either had not
yet become prevalent enough to significantly affect the first sale
doctrine, and where these measures were in effect, the likelihood of a
reduction of or elimination of a resale market for copies did not
amount to interference with the operation of the first sale doctrine.
93
In short, no legislative steps were suggested to accommodate the first
sale doctrine in the digital world, but rather a "wait and see" approach
was advanced. 94 Given the burgeoning digital content market, it
doesn't seem that consumers consider the ability to resell content
important.
VIII. MAINTAINING AVAILABILITY AND ACCESS IN THE
DIGITAL ERA
Interest groups have argued that the first sale doctrine could
erode under the DMCA and thus have a significant effect on access in
the digital era. They maintain that the first sale doctrine ensures that
copies of a work would remain available to the public over a long
period of time in a secondary market, even if a copyright owner
ceases to make a work available to the primary market. Perhaps other,
more successful works have eclipsed a particular work, or the author
feels that times have changed. An author's heirs may also refuse to
allow any further sales, performance, or public display. In response,
content providers would probably make the argument that no such
demise would occur, and that instead, illegal reproduction has always
been illegal.
Copyright owners discontinue a large number of books and
recordings each year. One estimate suggested that 60% of all sound
recordings are out of print.95 In 1999 alone, the vice chairman of
93. U.S. Copyright Office, Digital Millennium Copyright Study: Executive Summary, at
§ Ill(A), http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/dmcaexecutive.html (last visited May
13, 2007).
94. Id.
95. Reese, supra note 19, at 593 (citing Ed Christman, Record-Rama Revolves Around
Inventory, BILLBOARD, Oct. 2, 1993, at 72).
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Barnes & Noble stated that 90,000 books went out of print.96 At some
point, this becomes an economic decision, as there is insufficient
demand to warrant the expense of printing, binding, storing, and
marketing a sufficient quantity of the work to be profitable. However,
"low demand" is not the same as "no demand." One can argue that
digitization of a work can preserve it in the market place due to
theoretically lower costs. Although eBooks have yet to score large
scale market penetration due to unwieldy devices and the existence of
97
multiple potentially incompatible media formats, it represents an
idea whose time will eventually come. A digital market, much like the
traditional secondary market, can ensure that even if demand falls
below a profitable amount for the owner to continue sales, the public
may still be able to access and derive benefit from the work.
Corporate entities have withdrawn copies of their works from the
marketplace, especially in the cases where the works would now be
offensive. This was the case in Silverman v. CBS Inc, in which CBS
owned the copyright to "The Amos 'n' Andy Show." 98 In response to
complaints of the show's offensive content, CBS did not broadcast or
allow the rebroadcast of any portions of the program in radio or
television formats. 99 What this meant was that people who wished to
watch the show were unable to obtain access to the program through
the copyright owner. As copyrights for works can last at least for the
life of the author plus 70 years, 100 it is even possible that works can be
inaccessible for generations. Worldwide Church of God v.
Philadelphia Church of God, Inc. offers another example of a
corporate copyright owner suppressing a work. 10 ' In Worldwide
Church, 9 million copies of a book written shortly before its author's
death were distributed to the public. 0 2 Within a two-year period
however, attitudes changed and the Worldwide Church of God
determined that it "conveyed outdated views that were racist in
nature."' 1 3 It then proceeded to destroy all copies of the work that it
96. Id.
97. See David Becker, Have e-books Turned a Page?, TECHREPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2004
(stating that none of the ebook devices have yet made significant market penetration).
98. Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d 40 (2d. Cir. 1989).
99. Jd. at 42.
100. See Hannibal Travis, Building Universal Digital Libraries: An Agenda for Copyright
Reform, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 761, 797 (2006) (noting that the current system can grant copyright
even up to 150 years).
101. Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 (9th
Cir. 2000).
102. Id. at 1ll3.
103. Id.
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retained in its possession and also stopped disseminating any
additional copies. 
104
In situations like the aforementioned, and assuming that not all
copies have been bought up by the copyright owner, the first sale
doctrine in traditional form preserves the public's access to the work
through alternative channels. The purpose of copyright law is to
encourage the creation and distribution of authored works to the
public by providing essentially monopolistic incentives for doing
so. 1°5 The first sale doctrine in conjunction with fair use has provided
an element of "peace of mind" as to the work's availability through
the secondary market channels. Interest groups have been pushing for
such assurances for digital works though it's not completely clear
how this secondary market would work. The interests of consumers in
having continued access to works is legitimate, and the concerns of
copyright owners in retaining their authorship rights and reputations
in light of changing times is also legitimate. The first sale doctrine has
historically provided this balance, by preserving initial distribution
rights with the copyright owners and encouraging at the same time
alternative means for the public to access the work. Interest groups
would argue that in a world that is moving towards digital
distribution, this may become an increasingly difficult balance to
preserve as more works are sold with DRM protection bolstered by
the DMCA. In response, content providers could argue that
maintaining this equal balance is no longer as essential as it once was
given that consumers now have more choices than ever as to how they
wish to acquire content.
Secondary market channels preserve works in a variety of
formats: CD's, magnetic tapes, vinyl records, and even some 8-tracks.
The secondary market has always let consumers lag behind the
technological curve and yet still enjoy access to the historical formats,
even though they might no longer be in production or officially
distributed by the copyright owner. But the secondary market
channels also may help to preserve the work itself over time.
Disseminating multiple copies can help ensure the survival of a work
in a variety of ways. Fires, earthquakes, and floods can affect all
kinds of works. Thus, the more copies of works that exist, the more
likely it is that a single copy will survive over time. If one assumes
104. Id.
105. Joshua M. Siegel, Reconciling Shareholder Limited Liability with Vicarious
Copyright Liability: Holding Parent Corporations Liable for the Copyright Infringement of
Subsidiaries, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 535, 541-42 (2007).
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that a single copy of a work (digital or physical) has a 1% chance of
being destroyed in a given year, then after 200 years, the chance that
this single copy will survive becomes 13%.106 But, if there were 100
copies in multiple places, each facing the same 1% chance of
destruction, the odds that a copy will survive to the 200-year mark
becomes 99.9999944%. 107 Also, the range of the environments in
which these copies are located means that it is more likely that at least
some will endure conditions that will enable them to survive over
time. Throughout history, "[t]he great concentrations of books,
usually found in the centres of power, were the main victims of...
destructive outbreaks, ruinous attacks, sackings and fires... In
consequence, what has come to us is derived not from the great
centers but from 'marginal' locations. ' 0 8 Even if a work isn't popular
during its copyright term, it may still serve a significant historical
purpose and as inspiration to contemporary authors. As an example,
Martin Scorcese's successful Gangs of New York movie derived from
an obscure book. 109 In the case of digital works, they have been
preserved in multiple different formats and are available through so
many different channels, that long-term preservation is less of an
issue. Furthermore, it's easy for a content provider to create another
digital copy of a work. The fact that digital works can be accessed
remotely means that they might be stored in a more secure
environment to begin with.
Aside from preservation, accessibility, and affordability, the
mere fact that there is a resale market can further encourage the initial
purchase of a work from a copyright holder in the first place. The
environment in which the first sale doctrine functions is vastly
different than at its inception, as digital networks and technological
protection schemes become more prevalent and widespread. Interest
groups have predicted that the rise of digital networks could result in
fewer works being distributed to the public in the form of tangible
copies, which would be easily transferable through secondary market
channels. They might in fact be right, but does it matter? To
analogize: "If a tree falls in the forest, does anyone care?" The




106. See Reese, supra note 19, at 605.
107. Id. at 606.
108. Id. at 605.
109. Id.
110. Digital Millennium Copyright Study, supra note 93, at § Ill(A).
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IX. HIGH PRICE/LOW PRICE
Availability and price are intertwined, and digital distribution
may be a double-edged sword. It increases the availability of
copyrighted works while simultaneously increasing the cost of buying
a used copy. Interest groups have argued that there's no guarantee that
digital works will be more affordable than their tangible
counterparts.1 ' What these interest groups fail to appreciate is that
maintaining a viable retail channel system requires many
intermediaries and that necessitates an increase from the wholesale
price at each step in the distribution process, which direct digital
distribution can effectively reduce or completely eliminate. Thus,
digital distribution can potentially offer access to copyrighted works
at a lower cost than the purchase of a retail copy, but the question is
whether the work will be offered independent of being tethered to
specific hardware, per use charges, or ongoing subscription fees,
which can all bring elements of uncertainty as to future price and
availability as compared to a tangible copy, which ensures access for
the lifespan of the media or reader. Because consumers don't
naturally purchase the same movie or music twice, further
investigation is required to determine whether it has reduced the
number of used physical copies in the secondary market, and raised
the price of tangible media. What these action groups fail to
appreciate is that the digital market now competes with tangible
media. 12 The public as a whole benefits from retail price competition
when tangible copyrighted works are sold through multiple retailers
and could similarly benefit from multiple competing digital retail
channels.
X. HEAR TODAY/GONE TOMORROW
Historically, the first sale doctrine combined with a secondary
market enables continued access to copyrighted works when the
copyright owner decides to stop producing and selling additional
copies of the work. But digitalization of content can actually reduce
or even eliminate the issue of a work from going out of print in the
first place. Digitalization can mean "books on demand" when a
publisher finds the costs of storing physical copies prohibitive
111. Music prices remained relatively constant despite the advent of digital CD's over
analog cassettes. iTunes also charges the same price as most music retailers, though the main
advantage is that there is virtually no "shipping" time.
112. For example, content providers are in the midst of rolling out the HD-DVD format,
which promises to provide greater clarity, capacity, and features.
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because of low demand.1 3 The back-end costs of digitalization are
arguably lower because only the digital file needs to be stored. A
move to on-demand digital dissemination, however, means that a
copyright owner's decision to discontinue access to a work could be
that much more rapid. It is comparably easier to remove a work from
a digital database than it is to remove it from a secondary market.
Thus, digital dissemination has not only the potential to eliminate
unlawful access to a work, but lawful access as well.
In the case of tethered copies, if users are able to purchase works
to download to their hard drive that are not encumbered by DRM
restrictions, they can access those files even if and after the copyright
owner takes them offline. In the case of technologically tethered
copies, the owner can use that copy as long as he/she owns the
original tethered equipment. These encumbrances prevent selling,
renting, or even lending a tethered copy, all which are permissible
under a traditional first sale doctrine. So even if a large number of
people have purchased a digital work, these protection measures can
ultimately result in the virtual disappearance of a work as quickly as it
has spread. In the case of Apple's iTunes, if Apple pulls the plug on
its backend authorization infrastructure, users will no longer be able
to transfer their music to and activate other authorized computers.
They may in fact be required to repurchase their downloaded content
in other media formats.
Paper has been used for hundreds if not thousands of years as a
literary medium. Acid-free paper has further enhanced the longevity
of such works.' 14 Once a book is printed on paper, preserving it
doesn't require much if any investment other than a dry shelf.
However, in the case of digitized musical works, preservation can be
quite costly, as it requires a continued investment in storage media
and retrieval equipment on the part of end-users and content
providers. 115 Compared with paper, the lifespan of storage media is
quite finite and the potential obsolescence of the equipment required
to read the media is also a constant problem as technology evolves.
Looking at the recent history of storage media illustrates the problem:
8-inch floppies were introduced in 1971; 5-1/4 inch floppies were
113. For example, Amazon.com has partnered with Hewlett-Packard in order to provide
books on demand. HP Press Release, Amazon.com Selects HP to Print Books on Demand, Dec.
4, 2006, http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/newsroom/press/2006/061204a.html?mtxs=rss-corp-news.
114. Mowhawkpaper.com, Paper Permanence,
http://www.mohawkpaper.com/pdfs/Paper/ 20Permanence.pdf (last visited May 13, 2007).
115. Continued utilization of iTunes requires an investment in, at the very least, a
computer and iPod.
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introduced in 1976; 3-1/2 inch floppies were introduced in 1984, and
have already been eliminated entirely from Apple Computer's
machines. 1 6 Content not transferred is content lost. Such movement
to prevent loss due to obsolescence has been called "digital
resuscitation" in the industry. BBC experienced this obsolescence
with its Domesday Project in the 1980's in which the discs were only
accessible through a proprietary computer system." 7 The information
archive was fortunately rescued but this example is demonstrative of
not only the long-term problems of digital storage, but also what it
means for continued public access to works. DVD's may last 100
years, but the real issue is whether anyone will know what a DVD is,
and will anything play it. In comparison, future generations should be
able to easily read the Domesday Book, which has survived on paper
since 1086.118
Now, owners of digital works will have to continuously migrate
their collections to prevent them from being lost on obsolete media
and platforms. These migrations, however, may run afoul of copyright
law if not deemed to be fair use. This could put consumers in the
awkward position of repurchasing content they already own on
obsolete, unplayable, or degraded media. Libraries can rely on
Section 108 of the 1976 Copyright Act, which permits libraries to
make up to 3 copies of a work if the existing format in which the
work is stored has become obsolete, and if an unused replacement
cannot be obtained." 9 While providing some relief, this measure is
limited to libraries, and it only applies if the library already owns the
work to begin with. 20 Even so, the DMCA in its current form forbids
any circumvention of digital methods to prevent reproduction.
Therefore, in the event that large-scale DRM protected digitization
grabs a market foothold, libraries are concerned about maintaining
access to works.
116. See Apple and the Floppy Drive,
http://home.socal.rr.com/fuweb/floppysite/theend.html (last visited May 13, 2007).
117. See Paul Wheatley, Digital Preservation and BBC Domesday, from the presentation
at the Electronic Media Group, Annual Meeting of the American Institute for Conservation of
Historic and Artistic Works Portland, Oregon June 14, 2004 available at
http://aic.stanford.edu/sg/emg/pdfs/Wheatley-EMG2004.pdf.
118. See The Domesday Book Online, http://www.domesdaybook.co.uk/ ("The original
Domesday Book has survived over 900 years of English history and is currently housed in a
specially made chest at London's Public Record Office in Kew, London.").
119. See 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2000).
120. See id; Rebecca Bolin, Locking Down the Library: How Copyright, Contract, and
Cybertrespass Block Internet Archiving, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 22 (2006).
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XI. THE EFFECT OF FAIR USE ON ACCESS CONTROLS
The average individual accesses dozens of copyright protected
works on a daily basis: on radio; television; the Internet. What has
changed from the analog to the digital age is the ability of copyright
holders to control access to their works on a more exacting basis
through access controls. Copyright holders legitimately maintain that
the digital realm is rife with the potential for piracy and mass
infringement, and poses a unique and serious threat to their
livelihood. Consumer advocacy groups have responded that while
section 1201(c) of the DMCA states that the anti-circumvention
provisions in the DMCA are intended neither to alter any rights,
remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, such as




While it is more effective, less expensive, and less time
consuming to forbid the trafficking of circumvention devices instead
of instituting legal actions against each circumventer, 22 consumer
interest groups allege that the enactment of the DMCA has
significantly shifted the balance of protection to the copyright holders,
the result being that the fair use defense only allows users who
already have legal access to a work to circumvent measures that
protect rights controls.' 23 If a user circumvents access control
measures, even for satirical/parody/commentary purposes under the
principle of fair use, the user may in fact be in violation of §
1201(a)(1)(A), effectively meaning that lawful access must occur
before fair use enters into play, if at all. And that's the issue here: Is
fair use a bygone concept in the digital era? Even more so, the anti-
circumvention rule extends to all elements of the content, even those
that are not copyrightable, so while unauthorized extraction of these
portions would not violate copyright law, it would violate the DMCA.
Interest groups have argued that since DRM restrictions are
backed by the force of law in the form of the DMCA, they pose a
threat to the future of fair use. Basing their arguments on Sony, they
maintain that if fair use is to continue to evolve as technology does,
that DRM should make accommodations for consumer
121. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (2000).
122. See Yijun Tian, Problems of Anti-Circumvention Rules in the DMCA & More
Heterogeneous Solutions, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 749, 767-68 (2005).
123. Given the costs of these formal lawsuits, the RIAA has rolled out a website through
which accused infringers can settle suits made against them online. See P2PLawsuits.com,
http://www.p2plawsuits.com/P2P_00_Home.aspx (last visited May 13, 2007).
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experimentation and activities. They maintain that fair use activities
can be difficult to anticipate even in light of current technology, and
argue that time shifting was difficult to imagine in the era before
VCR's: What began with a fair use ruling for time shifting in Sony
124
resulted in the widespread adoption of the VCR, which has now
evolved into the DVR (Digital Video Recorder). While the VCR may
have increased piracy in the short term, they maintain that it also
opened new markets for "back catalog" films, leading to a net overall
gain. 125 Interest groups have argued that the same would be true for
music. What these interest groups don't appreciate and account for in
their arguments are the differences between the markets. First, it's
unclear what back-catalog of music would develop that doesn't
already exist. Secondly, the effects of piracy on the movie industry
are greater than that on the record industry. This is due to the fact that
a movie company invests a greater amount of capital into each movie
than a record company invests into each record. 126 Also, while each
DVD usually only contains one movie, there can be upwards of 15
individual works on a CD. This means that in the case of music, the
"pirates sail in a larger sea," and their potential effect on the overall
market could be less as a result.
The anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA have an effect
on the traditional defenses raised in copyright law such as fair use,
even though Section 1201(c)(1) states that "[n]othing in this section
shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright
infringement, including fair use... ,,'2 7 This is because the anti-
circumvention prohibitions are separate and distinct from copyright
infringement. 128  Individuals can therefore be found liable for
circumventing an access control measure even if the use falls within
the scope of traditional fair use activities like a parody, satire, or
124. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
125. See Mike Snider, Record year for DVDs, USA TODAY, Jan. 5, 2005, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/life/movies/news/2005-01-05-dvd-main-x.htm. (In a record year, the
2004 year-end sales of DVDs brought the movie studios $24.5 billion in revenue compared to
the $9.4 billion they earned from the theaters).
126. RIAA.com, Anti-Piracy: Old As the Barbary Coast, New As the Internet, supra note
92 ("Eighty-five percent of recordings released don't even generate enough revenue to cover
their costs. Record companies depend heavily on the profitable fifteen percent of recordings to
subsidize the less profitable types of music, to cover the costs of developing new artists, and to
keep their businesses operational. The thieves often don't focus on the eighty-five percent; they
go straight to the top and steal the gold.").
127. See 17 U.S.C § 1201(c)(1) (2000).
128. See, e.g., Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1197 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) ("[C]ircumvention is not a new form of infringement but rather a new violation
prohibiting actions or products that facilitate infringement ....").
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commentary. Interest groups argue that DRM bolstered by the DMCA
makes the copyright holder the arbiter of the range of activities that
constitute fair use of their work due to the fact that the integrity of
these digital limits are bolstered by the force of law. As the content
marketplace continues to become more digitized, these groups have
argued DRM access controls will "creep" into collections of works
that not only contain limited portions of copyrighted material, but also
contain substantial portions from the public domain as well, in the
form of "thin copyrights." Thus, protecting these works with access
control mechanisms bolstered by the DMCA could give copyright
owners significant control over works that may not be copyrightable.
However, it's apparent that the market has great faith in the digital
media movement. It has absolutely exploded within the last decade
and will continue to provide what consumers seek. Perhaps these
groups fail to appreciate the inherent market risks of the digital era on
content providers, and take the availability of the content for which
they seek fair use, for granted.
XII. JUDICIAL EFFECTS ON FAIR USE
On June 27, 2005 the Supreme Court issued its unanimous
decision in MGM v. Grokster, vacating the 9th Circuit's holding, on
the grounds that the lower court had misinterpreted the Supreme
Court's Sony decision. 2 9 Under the Court's ruling, Grokster could be
liable for infringement that occurred through the use of their product
or "device.' 30 The Ninth Circuit reached beyond Sony, which stated
that as long as a device had a substantial non-infringing use,
manufacturers of such devices could not be held liable for their
potentially illegal uses in violation of copyright.' 3 ' The Supreme
Court in Sony stated that instead of exploring all the potential uses of
a device, a court only needs to decide whether a significant number of
possible uses for a device would be non-infringing. 32 The Grokster
Court seemed to articulate in its holding the requirement that these
non-infringing uses instead be the primary function of the device for a
manufacturer to avoid liability. The Sony Court did not address the
other potentially infringing uses for the VCR, such as "the transfer of
tapes to other persons, the use of home-recorded tapes for public
129. MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 934 (2005)
130. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936-37 (2005). The Grokster service shut down on November
7, 2005. See http://www.grokster.com/ for the company's notice.
131. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 915.
132. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
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performances, or the copying of programs transmitted on pay or cable
television systems" in its analysis.
133
In Grokster, the Supreme Court articulated that the "safe-harbor"
would not protect makers of a technology who induce their customers
to break copyright. 34 This is interesting, because Sony, like Grokster,
advertised the potentially illegal uses of its technology such as the
ability to "time shift" recordings.1 35 The Supreme Court's rationale
was that Grokster could be found liable for contributory copyright
infringement despite its product's potentially lawful uses, since the
distributors knew that their software was used primarily to download
copyrighted works and the evidence demonstrated that the distributors
intended that their software be used for copyright infringement
purposes.136 The distinction here was that the Sony safe-harbor only
applied to multiple purpose devices that did not have the sole function
of infringing copyrights. Grokster, as a device, served a singular
purpose according to the Court, designed to encourage infringing
activity, rather than one that could merely be used for infringing
activity like a VCR. 137 Therefore, Grokster could not claim that its
online service fell within the enumerated category of fair use deemed
permissible in Sony. Grokster's business model clearly depended on
inducing infringement to sell advertising to users. 138 The occurrence
of massive infringing activity was Grokster's lifeblood, and that use
was not shielded by the limited liability concept that arose in Sony.'
39
Another key difference that may have contributed to the difference
between the holdings in Sony and Grokster is that the VCRs in Sony
were analog devices, which limited both the quantity and quality of
any infringing copies made. Digital infringement has the potential to
be massive, while preserving the "bit for bit" quality of the original.
So while the concept of Sony survives, Grokster modified and
clarified it to contend with the inherent risks of these new
technologies.
133. Id. at 780.
134. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936-37.
135. See David J. Tetzlaff, Home Video, The Museum of Broadcast Communications,
http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/H/htmlH/homevideo/homevideo.htm (last visited May 13,
2007).
136. Grokster, 545 U.S. a 938-39.
137. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 933 (describing MGM's assertion that 90% of the works that
were available on the Grokster network were copyrighted).
138. Id. at 939-40.
139. See supra, note 137 and parenthetical.
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XIII. STRONG MEASURES
The traditional notion of copyright protection has strengthened
significantly in the digital era. Two developments within the last
decade have changed the landscape substantially. The Sonny Bono
Copyright Extension Act of 1998 extended copyright protection in the
United States to 70 years after the author's death. 140 The following
day, the DMCA was signed into law, amending Title 17 of the US
Code to further extend the reach of copyright to authored works in the
digital realm. 141 While copyright serves to protect the rights of
authors, it arguably serves a more important second purpose as
enumerated in the Constitution, "[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts. 142
Leading up to the Sonny Bono Act and DMCA is a judicial and
legislative history that worked to define and preserve fair use
activities, but these efforts were better suited to the pre-digital era. In
Sony, the Supreme Court held that recording a television show for
"time shifted" purposes was a legal use of the content. 43 While it is
legal to lend a physical book to a colleague, it's possible that DRM
backed by the DMCA on electronic books can make such lending
impossible. 144 While excising content from a CD was permissible
under traditional notions of fair use such as satire, parody, or
commentary, it may be no longer legal to do so if circumvention of
the DRM scheme is required in the process. 145 Interest groups have
responded with arguments that even before Congress outlawed
circumvention technologies it was still unlawful to engage in the
140. 17 U.S.C § 302 (2000).
141. Devon Thurtle, A Proposed Quick Fix To the DMCA Overprotection Problem That
Even a Content Provider Could Love... or at Least Live With, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1057,
1071 (2005).
142. Feist Publi'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) ("The
primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but '[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.' ... To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their
original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information
conveyed by a work .... This result is neither unfair nor unfortunate. It is the means by which
copyright advances the progress of science and art.") (citations omitted).
143. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
144. Poitin Press, About eBooks, http://www.poitinpress.com/aboutebooks.html (last
visited Apr. 18, 2007).
145. Eliot Van Buskirk, Consumers fight back against new protected CDs, CNET
REVIEWS, Jan. 18. 2002, http://reviews.cnet.com/4520-6450_7-5020808-1.html (fearing that the
DMCA gives the record companies the ability to block what was once a traditional fair use in
making copies of CDs).
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stealing of music. 14 6 Thus, these interest groups have argued that
illegal copying activities can still be prevented without the DMCA
even if circumvention technologies are allowed: "We could just as
well ask how we prevent other crimes such as jaywalking, tax fraud,
or even murder. Society prevents dangerous activities by passing laws
that make such activities illegal and by punishing people who break
the laws."'147 However, these interest groups, again, fail to appreciate
the necessity of DRM in preserving marketplace incentives for
content providers given the speed with which piracy can occur in the
digital era.
Interest groups have also argued that the reverse engineering
exemption in § 1201 (f) is inadequate because reverse engineering has
other legitimate uses beyond strict interoperability that are not
allowed by the DMCA. More specifically, reverse engineering efforts
to build a competitive product that circumvents protections in the
process are not permitted. 148 Additionally, "interoperability" is
narrowly defined by the DMCA as meaning "the ability of computer
programs to exchange information, and of such programs mutually to
use the information which has been exchanged[,]' 149 which excludes
other legitimate types of interoperability such as Application
Programming Interface (API) level replacements for computer
libraries. The DMCA also only exempts reverse engineering for
computer programs, not for network protocols or hardware devices. 
5 0
Finally, section 1201 (f) provides a reverse engineering exemption, but
sections 1201(a)(2) and 1201(b) clearly prohibit the act of providing
technologies that are "primarily designed for the purpose of
circumventing protection."' 15' To some therefore, the DMCA appears
to contradict itself: Even though a narrow reverse engineering
exemption exists, the language makes it illegal to manufacture the
tools that would enable one to utilize the exemption in the first place.
Consumer advocacy groups point to the role of the DMCA in the
DeCSS case, in which the MPAA sued programmers who shared
146. Columbia Pictures Inds., Inc. v. Landa, 974 F. Supp. 1, 16 (1997) (stating that
illegally duplicated videocassettes of movies was infringement of Plaintiffs copyrights).
147. See Digitalconsumer.org, Frequently Asked Questions, at Question 2.5,
http://www.digitalconsumer.org/faq2.html#analoghole (last visited May 13, 2007).
148. See 17 U.S.C § 1201(f) (2000) (allowing for reverse engineering for the limited
purpose of interoperability).
149. Id. at § 1201(f)(4).
150. Id. at § 1201(f).
151. See id. at §§ 1201(a)(2), (b), (f).
[Vol. 23
ACCESS CONTROLS, FAIR USE & FIRST SALE 715
developed code that provided interoperability with DVD encoding, 152
arguing that that this was exactly the type of reverse engineering
supposedly protected by the DMCA's exemption.
53
XIV.THE EFFECT OF THE DMCA ON SONY AND ITS
PROGENY
Consumer rights groups are concerned that the landmark ruling
in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,' 54 is at risk of being
legislatively brushed aside by the DMCA. The Sony case dealt with
fair use copying of television broadcasts onto videotapes, 55 but
technology has marched on since. The Sony opinion states that it is
only effective in the absence of legislative intent with respect to
copying, which means: "[i]n a case like this, in which Congress has
not plainly marked our course, we must be circumspect in construing
the scope of rights created by a legislative enactment which never
contemplated such a calculus of interests."'I5 6 The DMCA, enacted
substantially later than Sony, pays homage to the case since it refers to
the copying capabilities of "analog videocassette recorders."' 57 The
DMCA effectively closes the loopholes under Sony, but rights groups
argue that it has done so clumsily, proscribing areas of technology
that could possibly be used for non-infringing purposes. 58 The critical
portion of the Sony ruling was that a technology with a "substantial
non-infringing use" would not be considered a technology that could
make the manufacturer a contributory infringer. 59 The DMCA closes
that loophole by eliminating trafficking in and the possession of
copying technology that can circumvent access controls for a
protected work. 1
60
152. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, I11 F. Supp.2d 294, 320 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
153. ld.
154. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
155. Id. at417.
156. Id. at431.
157. Joshua Schwartz, Thinking Outside the Pandora's Box: Why the DMCA is
Unconstitutional Under Article L §8 of the U.S. Constitution, 10 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 93, 106
(citing 17 U.S.C. § 1201(k)l(A)(i) (2004)).
158. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, Support the FAIR Use Act of 2007,
https://secure.eff.org/site/Advocacy?JServSessionldr008=r7utl ae4l2.app6a&cmd=dispIay&pag
e=UserAction&id 271 (last visited May 14, 2007).
159. See general discussion supra.
160. See Lee Kovarsky, A Technological Theory of the Arms Race, 81 IND. L.J. 917, 955
& n.203 (2006).
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Some cases since Sony are of particular interest given the Court's
treatment of the DMCA and Fair Use:
* In Universal City Studios v. Corley, plaintiffs sued an
individual who hacked the Content Scrambling System
(CSS) for DVDs and created a program that would allow
users to play DVD's on Linux machines. 61 The Court held
that even though the DMCA reverse-engineering for
computer system interoperability exception was applicable
to this technology, the fact that it circumvented an access
control meant that the 1201(a) provision remained
enforceable because the same circumvention technique could
be used by a non-Linux user as well on a copyright protected
work, and thus, the exception was overcome.' 
62
* In 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., the
Court held that a manufacturer of a DVD copying program
was in violation of the DMCA (17 U.S.C. §1201(a)(2))
because it contained a portion designed for DRM
circumvention. 163 The most interesting portion of the Court's
holding was that the Court established that the right to copy
does not guarantee the right to make a good quality copy.
164
The court stated that although non-digital means for copying
existed, and that these methods would in fact result in a poor
reproduction of the original content, it did not consider the




DRM already lets content providers exact a significant amount
of control on individuals and what kind of activities they can engage
in with respect to the provider's content. "Renewable DRM,"
however, can be changed by content providers "on the fly" with a
firmware or software upgrade for an even higher level of control,
which is sometimes necessary when a hacker has cracked the DRM
scheme. Microsoft's Media Center PC was a significant advance, able
to record television programs to its hard drive and then able to bum
161. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
162. Schwartz, supra note 157, at 109.
163. 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal.
2004).
164. Schwartz, supra note 157, at 110.
165. See id.
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copies of the programs to disc. 166 Individuals engaged in regular
recording of several of HBO's series, including "The Sopranos. 167
After some time on the market, HBO then triggered a flag marker in
its content's DRM that prevented the Media Center Software from
burning copies of the program.1 68 In some cases, upgrades are pushed
to users, which they must install in order for them to continue to
utilize these devices or newly released ones. Apple Computer's
iTunes program originally permitted customers to make 10 copies of
identical playlists until April 2004, when it was subsequently reduced
to 7 copies through an iTunes program update. 169 As new iPods and
features have been released, Apple has required users to upgrade to
later versions of iTunes that may also contain more robust DRM
alongside new features. Similarly, iTunes 4.0 enabled Internet music
sharing, but the 4.0.1 update replaced this to only allow local, same-
network sharing.
170
Digital Video Recorders (DVRs) also contain DRM technologies
that enable providers to control content and even archival activity on
the devices. At one point, HBO announced that it would disable the
long term archiving of the show "Six Feet Under," expiring saved
shows from the devices in a matter of weeks.' 71 While content
providers naturally follow similar patterns in releasing material: 1)
Movies, 2) DVD/Cable, the control that these providers have over the
consumer experience is significantly greater. Simply put: videotapes
don't expire, but they grow obsolete and deteriorate. Also, the
videotapes don't have "renewable DRM" and are not subject to the
direct control of the copyright holder when they are outside of the
playback unit, unlike content that is stored directly on a DVR device.
These interest groups argue that in a modern digital world, because
users don't actually have their "hands on" the content, these users
may no longer be able to engage in traditional time shifting as
outlined in Sony because of the nature of DRM protections in
166. Rob Pegoraro, Microsoft's Improved Media Center Still Falls Short, WASHINGTON
POST, Dec. 12, 2004, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A56864-2004Decl l?language=printer (last visited
Apr. I1, 2007).
167. Electronic Frontier Foundation, Digital Rights Management: A Failure in the
Developed World, a Danger to the Developing World, at 12,
http://www.eff.org/IP/DRMITUDRMpaper.pdf (last visited May, 14 2007).
168. Id. at 12-13.
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conjunction with how digital works are distributed. Their concern is
that these protections could also extend to works in the public domain
as well which one may use without cost or permission. Because DRM
can be applied to public domain works in the same manner as it is
applied to copyrighted works, these groups have argued that the
DMCA's interaction with DRM could potentially create a pseudo-
copyright for works that might not even be entitled traditional
copyright protection under § 106.
XVI."I'M FROM THE GOVERNMENT AND I'M HERE TO
HELP"
172
The United States House and Senate committee reports indicate
that the DMCA may be exceeding its originally intended breadth.
173
In the Senate Report, the Senate stated that the original purpose of the
Act was to deal with mass infringement activities over the Internet
and networks. 74 An often referred to portion of the House Report in
DMCA cases is the following: "[t]he act of neutralizing a
technological protection measure by a copyright holder to control
access to the work is the electronic equivalent of entering unlawfully
inside a locked room with the goal to obtain a copy of the book."'
175
However, it's been argued that the act of circumventing a copy or
access control for a fair use is like removing a padlock that a private
citizen has arbitrarily put on the entrance to a public park.1
76
Interest groups are concerned that the Sony decision is being
effectively obsolesced with increasingly capable digital devices that
are replacing the VCR's to which the original holding applied. The
upcoming issue is therefore the permissible activities that will remain
in a DRM'ed world under the DMCA for new technology. Consumer
groups like the EFF would have us imagine a scenario in which
analog formats have gone the way of "leaded" gasoline, with
consumers entirely subject to the actions of digital content providers
who will dictate what constitutes a fair use of the work and in what
methods it can be accessed. I find this highly unlikely due to the
continued existence of the Domesday Book. The iTunes Music store,
172. Marie Cocco, A Contempt of Their Own, THE WASHINGTON POST WRITERS GROUP,
Mar. 8, 2007, http://www.postwritersgroup.com/archives/cocc0308.html (recalling President
Ronald Reagan's famous quip, "The nine most terrifying words in the English language are,
'I'm from the government and I'm here to help."').
173. Schwartz, supra note 157, at 116-17.
174. Schwartz, supra note 157, at 116.
175. Schwartz, supra note 157, at 119.
176. Id.
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which has become wildly popular in the few years it has been
operational represents a successful implementation of a digital fair
use doctrine. Although it contractually and technologically enforces a
fair use arrangement for its purchased content that is more limited
than traditional fair use, the iTunes DRM still allows the consumer to
engage in a defined "fair use" bubble that anticipates a habitual
consumer's fair use activities, while preventing mass piracy from
occurring. Consumer groups point out that the while the Supreme
Court's holding in Campell v. Acuff-Rose Music' 77 permitted parody,
satire, and sampling activities, the iTunes Store's relatively lenient
terms of service state that users "agree not to modify, rent, lease, loan,
sell, distribute, or create derivative works" from downloaded songs. 1
78
That aside, Apple's success shows that achieving a proper balance on
DRM can enable continued growth in the digital realm.
Congress has begun to address the DMCA in recent years, but as
I'll explain, not always for the better. On January 7, 2003,
Representative Rick Boucher introduced the Digital Media
Consumers' Rights Act of 2003, which exempted any person "acting
solely in furtherance of scientific research into technological
protection measures" from the restrictions of § 1201 of the DMCA. 179
It also exempted from the purview of the DMCA both non-infringing
circumvention activities and activities that involved trafficking
products "capable of enabling significant non-infringing use of a
copyrighted work."'180 This bill was ultimately sent to subcommittee
for hearings on May 12, 2004 but has since stalled. 1
81
Representative Zoe Lofgren also introduced a bill on March 4,
2003 entitled the "Benefit Authors without Limiting Advancement or
Net Consumer Expectations (BALANCE) Act of 2003. " 182 This bill
would have amended Title 17 to:
[1] include analog or digital transmissions of a copyrighted work
within fair use protections; [2] provide that it is not a copyright
infringement for a person who lawfully obtains or receives a
transmission of a digital work to reproduce, store, adapt, or access
177. Campell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
178. See Apple's iTunes Music Store: Terms of Service, supra note 9, at § 13(a),
179. Digital Media Consumer's Rights Act of 2003, H.R. 107, 108th Cong. § 5(a) (2003).
180. Id. at § 5(b).
181. Arnold P. Lutzker & Susan J. Lutzker, Altering the Contours of Copyright - The
DMCA and the Unanswered Questions of Paramount Pictures Corp. v. 321 Studios, 21 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 561, 587-88 (2005).
182. Benefit Authors without Limiting Advancement or Net Consumer Expectations
(BALANCE) Act of 2003, H.R. 1066, 108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter Balance Act of 2003].
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it for archival purposes or to transfer it to a preferred digital media
device in order to effect a non-public performance or display; [3]
allow the owner of a particular copy of a digital work to sell or
otherwise dispose of the work by means of a transmission to a
single recipient, provided the owner does not retain his or her copy
in a retrievable format and the work is sold or otherwise disposed
of in its original format; and [4] permit circumvention of copyright
encryption technology if it is necessary to enable a non-infringing
use and the copyright owner fails to make publicly available the
necessary means for circumvention without additional cost or
burden to a person who has lawfully obtained a copy or
phonorecord or a work, or lawfully received a transmission of it.
18 3
This represented an attempt at creating a digital first sale
doctrine, but it never left the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet,
and Intellectual Property.' 84 If enacted, the BALANCE Act would
have allowed a user to circumvent these controls to engage in non-
infringing use of the work only if the copyright holder has not made
publicly available the necessary means to permit the non-infringing
uses without additional cost or burden to users.'85 Congress took
notice from the holding in Sony that the law of copyright is a
"difficult balance between the interests of authors ... in the control
and exploitations of their writings.., on the one hand, and society's
competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and
commerce on the other hand .... ,,186 Copyright seeks to encourage
and reward creative efforts by securing a fair return for an author's
labor. 187 At the same time, Courts have acknowledged that "some
opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has been thought
necessary to fulfill copyright's very purpose, '[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts .... ,,,i88 Although the Copyright
Act has necessarily evolved over time to accommodate new
developments in technology, even as far back as the player pianos,
183. Id.
184. See Science & Intellectual Property in the Public Interest, Benefit Authors without
Limiting Advancement or Net Consumer Expectations (BALANCE) Act of 2003, American
Association for the Advancement of Science, (noting that the current status of the bill is that it is
still in subcommittee), http://sippi.aaas.org/ipissues/legislation/?res-id=48 (last visited Apr. 18,
2007).
185. Id.
186. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
187. Twentieth Century Music Corp v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
188. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994).
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which preceded the Copyright Act of 1909,189 content providers have
argued that the unique characteristics of digital technology and the
Internet's distribution mechanisms pose a legitimate threat to
copyright holders. The DMCA was thus enacted to provide a legal
framework to support the integrity of access and rights controls
designed to contend with the threat. The BALANCE Act explained
that:
[c]ontrary to the intent of Congress, Section 1201 of Title 17,
United States Code, has been interpreted to prohibit all users -
even lawful ones - from circumventing technical restrictions for
any reason. As a result, the lawful consumer cannot legally
circumvent technological restrictions, even if he or she is simply
trying to exercise a fair use or to utilize a work on a different
media device.
190
Congresswoman Lofgren, the author of the proposed BALANCE
Act, argued that it was necessary to restore the traditional balance
between copyright holders and society, and punish digital pirates
without treating every consumer as one.' 91 What the Congresswoman
fails to appreciate is that the DMCA might in fact be necessary to
ensure a stable content rich marketplace in the first place given the
free-for-all that occurred under Napster in its first incarnation.
Not to be deterred, Representative Boucher even reintroduced
his proposed Digital Media Consumers Rights Act of 2003 in the
form of H.R. 1201: the "Digital Media Consumer Rights Act of
2005," through which Title 17 U.S.C §1201 would have been
amended to exempt from its circumvention prohibitions persons
acting solely in furtherance of scientific research into those
technological measures.' 92 Specifically, H.R. 1201 would have
amended §1201(c) so that it would not have been a violation of
copyright law, but rather fair use to: (1) "circumvent a technological
measure in order to obtain access to a work for purposes of making
non-infringing use of the work;" or (2) "manufacture or distribute a
hardware or software product capable of substantial non-infringing
189. See Skyla Mitchell, Reforming Section 115: Escape From the Byzantine World of
Mechanical Licensing, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1239, 1241-42 (2007) (noting that the
debate about player piano roll reproduction spurred Congress to amend the Copyright Act for
"mechanical reproductions").
190. Balance Act of 2003, supra note 182. This bill was reintroduced by Rep. Lofgren as
H.R. 4536, 109th Cong. (2005), but ultimately met the same end.
191. See id
192. Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2005, H.R. 1201, 109th Cong. (2005).
2007]
722 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 23
uses except in instances of direct infringement., 193 The last major
action with respect to H.R. 1201 was its referral on March 22, 2005 to
the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer
Protection in which it subsequently stalled.
194
Although it could keep trying, perhaps Congress should remain
neutral in this matter and let the market decide. Senator Sam
Brownback's proposed "Consumers, Schools, and Libraries Digital
Rights Management Awareness Act," introduced in 2003, would have
banned the sale or importation of DRM-enabled content unless it
followed specific government regulations regarding making it
available for resale or charitable donation.195 Senator Ron Wyden's
"Digital Consumer Right to Know Act" would have required a
producer or distributor of copyrighted digital content to disclose the
nature of restrictions that limited the ability a purchaser to play, copy,
transmit, or transfer such content on, to, or between devices
commonly used with respect to that type of content. 196 It would have
required oversight by the Federal Trade Commission to ensure
disclosure of DRM limitations on: (1) recording for later viewing or
listening; (2) the reasonable and noncommercial use of legally
acquired audio or video content; (3) making backup copies of legally
acquired content subject to accidental damage, erasure, or destruction;
(4) using limited excerpts of legally acquired content; and (5)
engaging in the secondhand transfer or sale of legally acquired
content. 197 Even the Digital Media Consumer's Rights Act of 2005
would have established a series of regulations that would have
resulted in oversight by the Federal Trade Commission.' 98 These
proposed regulations included prohibiting selling or advertising a CD
unless its packaging described "minimum ... requirements for
playback or recordability on a personal computer," "any restrictions
on the number of times song files may be downloaded to the hard
drive of a personal computer," and "the applicable return policy for
consumers who find that the prerecorded digital music disc product
193. Id.
194. H.R. 1201 - 109th Congress (2005): Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2005,
GovTrack.us (showing that the bill is presently in committee),
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl 09-1201 (last visited Apr. 2, 2007),
195. Consumer, Schools, and Libraries Digital Rights Management Awareness Act of
2003, S. 1621, 108th Cong. § 6(c) (2003).
196. Digital Consumer Right to Know Act, S. 692, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003).
197. Id.
198. Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2005, H.R. 1201, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005)
("The Federal Trade Commission should be empowered and directed to ensure the adequate
labeling of prerecorded digital music disc products.").
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does not play properly .... "99 Governmental compulsory licensing
schemes have also been proposed, in which the government would
compensate artists for making their works available by increasing the
federal income tax as well as that which would be levied on related
goods and services. The amount of compensation would be based on
the type of use that was made and tracked by digital signature.20
These proposed schemes all share one common outcome: They
will turn one of the least regulated industries into one of the most
regulated. The comparatively lightly regulated information
technology industry represents about eight percent of the United
States' Gross Domestic Product, but about twenty-nine percent of its
growth.2°' Injecting government into the mix could cause a "wet
blanket" effect on a thriving market, and raise the costs incurred by
consumers and providers significantly. Economist David Friedman
has concluded that when the government, as opposed to private
actors, performs a function, it costs two to three times as much.20 2 Of
even more concern is the fact that another permanent regulatory
infrastructure would arise like the Copyright Office, and like it,
become the target of special interests and lobbying efforts. Taking the
decision making process from the mind of the consumer and putting it
with the government defeats the purpose and efficiency of the free
market.
iTunes has been so successful because the DRM terms are
transparent to the habitual consumer and unlikely to be reached
through normal user activities. z 3 Other schemes have not been so
successful. Circuit City's DIVX venture, which resembled a modified
pay-as-you-go/pay-per-view model, spectacularly flopped with
199. Id. at § 3.
200. See William W. Fisher III, An Alternative Compensation System, in PROMISES TO
KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 3 (Stanford Univ. Press,
2004), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/PTKChapter6.pdf.
201. Declan McCullagh and Milana Homsi, Leave DRM Alone: A Survey of Legislative
Proposals Relating to Digital Rights Management Technology and Their Problems, 205 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 317, 324 (2005).
202. Id. at 324 (citing DAVID FRIEDMAN, MACHINERY OF FREEDOM, GUIDE TO A RADICAL
CAPITALISM 30-95 (1973)).
203. See Apple's iTunes Music Store: Terms of Service, supra note 9, at § 9(b) (iTunes
customers are explicitly authorized: to "use the Products on five Apple-authorized devices at
any one time... export, bum.., or copy Products solely for personal, noncommercial use...
bum an audio playlist up to seven times ... [and] to store Products from up to five different
Accounts on certain devices, such as an iPod, at a time.").
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consumers. 20 4 DIVX allowed the consumer to make an initial movie
purchase for as low as $4.49, which allowed him/her to watch the
movie as many times as they wanted within a 48 hour viewing
period.2 °5 In order to watch the film again after that initial period, the
viewer had to reactivate the viewing period with the DIVX computer
206
and pay a subsequent fee. In other words, the player was tied in to
the phone line and a credit card number to view the movie. In
addition, DIVX discs could only be viewed on the player that it was
activated on - one could not take the movie to a friend's house to
watch it.20 7 Lastly, regular DVD players could not even play a DIVX
movie.20 8 Not much media attention has been paid to the Napster 2.0
subscription model either, and there must be a reason why iTunes
peaked at an 84% market share and the iPod has a 75% market share.
209 All one has to do is look at the terms of service with regards to the
DRM of failed (or failing) business models. Napster's DRM is
renewable on a monthly basis subject to the user's payment. 210 If the
consumer misses a payment or cancels the service, his/her
"subscribed" music becomes unplayable. 21 1 Most recently,
Microsoft's Zune wireless media player, released in November 2006
to a lukewarm reception, uses the Windows Media DRM (WMDRM)
scheme, which is completely proprietary to Microsoft212 and
represents an attempt by Microsoft to control both the device and
music service like Apple. However, unlike Apple, Microsoft finds
itself in the position of already licensing its "PlaysForSure" DRM
scheme to other device manufacturers and content providers that the
204. Steven V. Brull, Commentary: DVD and Conquer: Why One Technology Prevailed,




207. About.com: Home Theatre, DIVX Bites The Dust!. June 21, 1999,
http://hometheater.about.com/library/weekly/aa062199.htm.
208. Id.
209. See Peter Rojas, Live from the Steve Jobs Keynote - "One more thing...," Engadget,
Oct. 12, 2005,
http://www.engadget.com/2005/10/12/live-from-the-steve-jobs-keynote-one-more-thing.
210. Napster Terms and Conditions, effective June 30, 2006,
http://www.napster.com/terms.html.
211. See id.
212. See Stan Beer, Windows Media DRM versus Apple FairPlay Battle Looming?,
ITWIRE, Aug. 2, 2006,
http://www.itwire.com.au/index2.php?option=com-content&dopdf= 1&id=5168.
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Zune does not support. 213 As a result, anyone who purchased music
from Microsoft's MSN Music service (shuttered in November of
2006)214 who starts buying from Zune will need to get to get a new
Zune device, and their existing music won't go with them. On the
other hand if they go to a competing music service, such as Real's
Rhapsody, new music they purchase likely won't work on devices
they currently own either, but at least a new Rhapsody compatible
device will also allow them to play their old content. Microsoft has
made it abundantly clear that it "will not be performing compatibility
testing for non-Zune devices, and... will not make changes to [its]
software to ensure compatibility with non-Zune devices. 215 In fact,
one of the device's most touted features: "squirting" (wireless music
sharing) is crippled by another DRM scheme called "3-day-or-3-
play., 2 16 The DRM only allows for music files to be played a
maximum of three times on the device, and this feature expires after
three days whether they are played or not.217 In fact, playing one
minute of the song or half the song, whichever is shorter, counts as
"one play" and this assumes that the songs can be shared in the first
place, as observers have documented that about 40% of the most
popular Zune store downloads are flagged as non-shareable.21 8
Needless to say, the Zune platform has not performed well in the
marketplace.
2 19
XVII. WHERE DOES IT LEAVE US?
The South Huntington Library on Long Island, New York has 10
iPod Shuffles in its collection, and it uses them to loan out digital
213. Derek Slater, Microsoft's Zune Won't Play Protected Windows Media, Electronic
Frontier Foundation: Deep links, Sept. 15, 2006,
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/archives/004910.php.
214. See id
215. See Zune Problems for MSN Customers, BBC NEWS: TECHNOLOGY, Nov .6, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6120272.stm.
216. Cesar Menendez, Zuneless, Zune Insider: On Zune Wireless Send, Jan. 22, 2007,
http://zuneinsider.com/archive/2007/01/22/on-zune-wireless-send.aspx
217. See Wikipedia Online Dictionary, "3-day-or-3-play", http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/3-
day-or-3-play (last visited Apr. 8, 2007).
218. See id.; see also Universal and Sony Prohibit Zune Sharing for Certain Artists,
Engadget, Jan. 19, 2007, http://www.engadget.com/2007/01/19/universal-and-sony-prohibit-
zune-sharing-for-certain-artists/.
219. Using NPD Group's Zune sales data (that 29,000 units were sold for the month of
January 2007) and Microsoft's Nov. 13, 2006 press release (that the Zune would be available at
nearly 30,000 retailers), bloggers have extrapolated that Microsoft only sold one Zune per store.
Zune Sales: ONE Per Store?, Metroxing, Mar. 19, 2007,
http://metroxing.blogspot.com/2007/03/zune-sales-one-per-store19.html.
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audio book titles purchased from iTunes, which is, perhaps, a sign of
things to come. 220 The iTunes system has been an unparalleled
success, and I believe that we are merely in the infancy of a digital
distribution revolution. Once again, law finds itself catching up to
technology, and each sale of an iTunes track means that a copy of
music has been distributed that cannot be legally resold, edited,
excerpted, or otherwise sampled by that user.221 However, we have to
ask ourselves: with everything that iTunes and its competing services
offer, is that so bad? The content provider's defense is legitimate, and
in the case of record companies, what they are trying to do is ensure a
legitimate and accountable first sale of the music to a customer. The
labels do not make money on used record sales, and they also
arguably lose money from rampant piracy, which has been made
much easier in the digital era. Apple's apparently found a market
balance without specific government intervention where the wants of
consumers match the needs of the content providers. Apple says the
following regarding its purchased music files on its iTunes website:
"What you buy is yours to keep." 222 The way things stand now, that is
how they will stay. Ultimately, the market will determine what level
of karma it needs.
220. See Cyrus Farivar, Library Shuffles Its Collection, WIRED, Mar. 03, 2005,
http://www.wired.com/news/mac/0,2125,66756,00.html.
221. "Illegal" is not the same as "impossible." Purchased iTunes music can be burned to a
CD and then re-ripped in an unprotected format of the user's choice. This is a relatively easy,
but time consuming trick. The FairPlay DRM is stripped from the burned content through this
process, yet the specific song playlist that was burned can only be done so for a total of 7 times
per the program's limitations, which remain intact.
222. See Apple iTunes Store, http://www.apple.com/itunes/store/ (last visited Apr. 18,
2007).
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